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Strict Liability for Defective Product Design 
THE QUEST FOR A WELL-ORDERED REGIME 
Larry S. Stewart† 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Restatement (Third) Torts: Products Liability (hereafter 
“Restatement (Third)”) was an ambitious effort to codify and update 
thirty years of products liability development and evolution. It sought to 
describe a “well-ordered” set of rules to guide courts and practitioners, 
but given the highly politicized nature of the subject, doing so was not 
without controversy, and success has been elusive. Whether the new 
Restatement will ultimately be judged a success depends in large part on 
how success is defined, and, while that outcome may still await future 
developments, some conclusions can already be drawn.  
For one, the new Restatement has resulted in focusing attention 
on many issues and setting an agenda for debate and discussion. For 
another, it has already served to clarify and improve some aspects of 
products liability law. For example, while the core provisions of section 
2(b) were and remain highly controversial, within that section are rules 
that bring welcomed improvements such as the comment d provision, 
which states that “open and obvious” dangers do not necessarily preclude 
liability1 and other rules that are already finding judicial approval such as 
the comment l provision that a warning is not a substitute for a safer 
design, and when a safer design can reasonably be implemented, it is the 
seller’s duty to do so rather than merely warning of the risk.2 In addition, 
section 11, post-sale failure to recall, forges new but needed ground, and 
section 18, dealing with disclaimers and other contractual exculpations, 
states an obvious rule in a concise, direct way.3  
  
 † Larry S. Stewart is a member of the Council of the American Law Institute, the 
American College of Trial Lawyers, the American Board of Trial Advocates, the International 
Academy of Trial Lawyers, the International Society of Barristers, and the Inner Circle of 
Advocates. A frequent author and lecturer in tort law, he has received numerous professional 
awards. 
 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmts. g, l (1998).  
 2 Kampen v. Am. Isuzu Motors, Inc., 157 F.3d 306 (5th Cir. 1998); Rogers v. Ingersoll-
Rand Co., 144 F.3d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Martinez, 977 S.W.2d 328 
(Tex. 1998). 
 3 Restatement Third also leaves open the question of whether direct-to-consumer mass 
marketing of prescription drugs and medical devices should obviate the learned intermediary rule. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 6 cmt. e (1998). For recent developments in that 
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It is, however, a much different picture for what is arguably the 
most important part of the project: the core provisions for design defect 
claims.4 Those provisions, contained in section 2(b), proposed sweeping 
new changes that would (1) restrict design defect claims to a negligence 
based, risk/benefit regime in which proof of an alternative design would 
be mandated,5 (2) abolish 402A strict liability and relegate its consumer 
expectation test to only a factor for consideration in the risk/benefit 
regime, and (3) prevent alternative pleading of any other theory of 
liability. In effect, Restatement (Third) would create a new “reasonable 
alternative design” test for the vast majority of defective design claims. 
Born in controversy and at odds with the original rationales for 
and concepts of strict liability, many viewed those core provisions as 
anti-consumer. And, as critics predicted, in the ensuing decade, those 
provisions have been largely rejected by the courts, with findings that 
they go “beyond the law,” set the bar for recovery too high, and would 
amount to regression in the law. 
This Article will explore the development of the Restatement 
(Third), how the design defect proposals veered off course, why the core 
provisions for design defect claims have been rejected, and what should 
be the guiding principles and normative rules in a well-ordered strict 
liability design defect regime with appropriate conceptual foundations. 
II. PRODUCTS LIABILITY FOR DESIGN DEFECTS 
Modern products liability law sprang from wide-spread 
dissatisfaction with the glacial progress and often unsuccessful results of 
negligence claims for product defects. While privity limitations had been 
largely eliminated by the 1960s,6 liability remained elusive because of 
“contract” limitations and defenses, and often insurmountable proof 
requirements concerning what went wrong and how manufacturers failed 
to act reasonably. As a result, critics argued that new rules were needed, 
which would recognize that products sellers7 bore special responsibility 
  
regard, see Perez v. Wyeth Laboratories, 734 A.2d 1245 (N.J. 1999) and State ex rel. Johnson & 
Johnson Corporation v. Karl, 647 S.E.2d 899 (W. Va. 2007). 
 4 By the early 1980s, claims of unsafe design came to predominate products liability 
litigation. Aside from the sheer number of such claims, each commands special attention because a 
single case can implicate an entire product line. 
 5 Under Restatement (Third), there are some situations in which proof of an alternative 
design is not required. They are manifestly unreasonable design cases under section 2(b) comment e; 
circumstantial evidence cases under section 3; statutory violations under section 4; food product 
cases under section 7; and failure-to-recall cases under section 11. For most cases, however, proof of 
an alternative design would be a requisite element. 
 6 E.g., MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (Ct. App. N.Y. 1916) 
(recognizing negligence actions); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960) 
(rejecting privity and recognizing implied warranty). 
 7 Products liability laws apply to all in the chain of distribution, including designers, 
manufacturers, wholesalers, distributors, and retailers, even if they do not have physical possession 
of the product. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 1, cmt. c (1998); e.g., Riveria v. 
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to consumers because they implicitly represented that their products are 
safe; the public has a right to expect that reputable setters will stand 
behind their products; and the burden of injuries should be placed upon 
those who market the products, rather than the users of those products.8  
Beginning with Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.9 and the 
adoption shortly thereafter of Restatement (Second) Torts section 402A, 
“strict liability” for product defects came to replace negligence as the 
primary basis for products liability. Section 402A avoided the inherent 
proof problems of negligence by providing for liability even though the 
seller “has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his 
product.”10  Under strict liability, sellers are liable for harms caused by 
products that are “in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous,” that 
is “dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by 
the ordinary consumer . . . .”11 In the lexicon of products liability law, 
this came to be known as the “consumer expectations” test. As such, it 
mirrored implied warranty of sales law stripped of its contractual 
limitations and defenses. Thus, after 402A, if a product malfunctioned, 
sellers were liable for both the loss of the product as well as any injuries 
resulting from the malfunction. 
The cost of rendering the product reasonably safe was not a 
factor in the liability equation. The manufacturer could either design out 
the defect or it had to bear the burden of resulting injuries. Liability did 
not exist, however, for all product defects. Section 402A recognized that 
there are some products that science and art cannot make completely safe 
but which still have utility. For those “unavoidably unsafe” products, 
comment k provided a defense to a seller who markets “an apparently 
useful and desirable product, [even though it is] attended with a known 
but apparently reasonable risk” as long as the seller provides “proper 
directions and warning.”12  
Under 402A there was no distinction between manufacturing and 
design defects.  Greenman itself involved a design defect,13 and the 
language of 402A clearly covers both types of defect. Indeed, the 
inclusion of comment k underscores that design defects were included 
since otherwise there would be no purpose for an “unavoidably unsafe” 
product defense. 
  
Baby Trend, Inc., 914 So. 2d 1102 (Fla. App. 2005). For ease of reference, the terms “seller” and 
“manufacturer” as appropriate will be generally used in this Article. 
 8 E.g., Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440-44 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., 
concurring). 
 9 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1963).  
 10 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (2)(a) (1963).  
 11 Id. § 402A (2)(a) cmt. i; see also id. § 402A (2)(a) cmt. g (“Defective condition. The 
rule . . . applies only where the product is . . . in a condition not contemplated by the ultimate 
consumer, which will be unreasonably dangerous to him.”).  
 12 Id. § 420(a) cmt. k. 
 13 Greenman, 377 P.2d at 899-90.  
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While 402A swept the land, the idea that product defectiveness 
could be determined on the basis of what an ordinary consumer would 
expect did not meet with universal acceptance. Some believed that 
defectiveness should be anchored in traditional negligence concepts, a 
proposition championed by Dean John Wade in his article “On the 
Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products.”14 Dean Wade argued for 
nullification of strict liability for all product defects, both manufacturing 
and design. He proposed instead that liability for defective products be 
based only on the reasonableness of the marketing decision under a 
reasonably prudent seller standard. Because his conceptual analysis 
utilized a number of risk/benefit factors, this approach came to be known 
as the “risk/benefit” test. That is, however, somewhat of a misnomer 
since Dean Wade did not advocate using the risk/benefit factors as a test 
of design defect. His proposal was only that the jury issue in such cases 
should be simply whether the defendant acted as a reasonably prudent 
marketer.15 
By the 1980s, what began as an academic debate became 
partisan as manufacturing interests began advocating that design defects 
should only be decided under a risk/benefit test.16 Their argument was 
that while the consumer expectation test was appropriate for 
manufacturing defect claims where consumers would expect that 
products were built according to design, it was meaningless for design 
defects since consumers could not know all the considerations involved 
in arriving at a particular product design. According to manufacturers, 
the only appropriate way to evaluate design defect claims was by a cost-
benefit analysis that weighs the risks and benefits of the design. This 
was, however, different from the simple negligence standard that had 
been proposed by Dean Wade. What the manufacturing industry sought 
was an express risk/benefit test whereby juries would have to make a 
cost- benefit analysis to determine liability.17  
This approach stood strict liability on its head by taking what 
was an affirmative defense under 402A for “unavoidably unsafe” 
  
 14 John W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 MISS. L.J. 825 
(1973). There were earlier iterations of Dean Wade’s article but this is the one commonly cited as 
the origin of the risk/benefit test. 
 15 Id. at 839-40. 
 16 Industry interests were coordinated by the Products Liability Advisory Council 
(PLAC). According to its web site, PLAC was formed in the early 1980s and consists of over 130 
corporate members representing a broad cross-section of product manufacturers and several hundred 
products liability defense attorneys that advocate for changes in products liability laws to favor 
manufacturers, principally through coordinating efforts across jurisdictions and filing amicus briefs. 
For an overview of cases tracing PLAC’s role, see Larry S. Stewart, Courts Overrule ALI 
“Consensus” On Products, TRIAL MAG., Nov. 2003, at 18. 
 17 This position is somewhat paradoxical since Defendants, such as Ford Motor (the 
Pinto car), the former A. H. Robbins (the Dalkon Shield), the asbestos industry, and McDonald’s 
(hot coffee), who knowingly make similar assessments and used them as a basis for not investing in 
product safety, have been subject to distain by juries in the form of significant punitive damage 
awards. 
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products and making it the basis of a liability regime in which products 
would be presumptively safe unless plaintiffs carried the burden of 
proving that the risks inherent in the product outweighed its benefits. 
Conceptually, the risk/benefit approach rejected corrective justice for a 
law and economics theory by which product sellers would be liable only 
when the risks of the product, on balance, outweighed the benefits of 
having the product on the market.  
Much confusion resulted in the ensuing arguments over the 
proper rule for design defect claims. Many courts did not seem to 
appreciate or chose to ignore the conceptual difference between strict 
liability and a negligence-based, risk/benefit theory. Resulting decisions 
were a hodge-podge of rules, ranging from the “consumer expectation” 
test to the “risk/benefit” test, with various hybrid combinations that 
conflated aspects of the two doctrines.18 The hybrid systems, however, 
lack the conceptual basis for applying rules, which are necessarily 
invoked in products liability cases. That lack of conceptual foundation 
led to confusing, inconsistent, and conflicting results.  
Nowhere is this more evident than in the recent decision of the 
Illinois Supreme Court in Mikolajczyk v. Ford Motor Co.19 There, in 
attempting to reconcile the consumer expectation and risk/benefit tests in 
a strict liability context, the court nonsensically concluded that “[t]hese 
two tests . . . are not theories of liability; they are methods of proof by 
which a plaintiff “may demonstrate” that the element of unreasonable 
dangerousness is met.”20 As the Mikolajczyk decision painfully 
demonstrates, conflating the two tests ultimately leads to doctrinal 
collapse.21 Unfortunately, in the development of Restatement (Third) the 
conceptual differences between strict liability and risk/benefit were 
ignored. Indeed, under Restatement (Third) strict liability for design 
defect ceased to exist, becoming just a label for what is a negligence 
based, risk/benefit concept.  
III. THE NEW RESTATEMENT 
In 1991 the American Law Institute undertook to draft a 
comprehensive new restatement of products liability law. That project 
proposed that products liability claims be divided into manufacturing 
defects, design defects, and failure to warn cases, a concept that closely 
paralleled the Products Liability Advisory Council (“PLAC”) agenda. 
For manufacturing defects, the proposed new Restatement acknowledged 
the basic rationales for modern products liability law and urged 
  
 18 John F. Vargo, The Emperor’s New Clothes: The American Law Institute Adorns a 
“New Cloth” for Section 402A Products Liability Design Defects: A Survey of the States Reveals a 
Different Weave, 26 U. MEM. L. REV. 493 (1996). 
 19 No. 104983, 2008 WL 4603565 (Ill. Oct. 17, 2008). 
 20 Id. at *20.  
 21 See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text; see infra note 43 and accompanying text. 
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continuance of a strict liability regime but with the twist that injured 
consumers could only bring a single claim, thus foreclosing the 
possibility of an alternative or independent claim for negligence.  
For design defects, the new Restatement also followed the PLAC 
agenda. According to the new Restatement, the policy rationales for strict 
liability were not applicable to design defect cases and a different 
concept of responsibility was needed. As related in the new Restatement, 
consumer expectations of safe design were allegedly too difficult to 
discern because consumers cannot know all the considerations involved 
in product design and the focus of liability instead should be on the 
“trade-offs” in product design and requiring consumers to bear 
responsibility for proper product use.22  This change would be 
accomplished by restricting design defect cases to a single negligence 
based, “risk-utility balancing” claim that required proof of an alternative 
design.23 Injured consumers would no longer have the option to bring 
alternative claims for both strict liability and negligence, could no longer 
bring design defect claims under 402A strict liability and its consumer 
expectation test, and, in most cases, experts would be required to present 
an alternative design for the product.  
While evidence of alternative design potentials was a common 
element of many products liability cases, especially when the defendant’s 
own records or conduct supplied the proof, there was little jurisprudential 
support for mandating it as a requisite element of a claim. And, the mere 
fact that plaintiffs presented such evidence does not justify making it a 
mandatory requirement. Indeed, even Dean Wade only considered it one 
of many other considerations in his analytical discussion.24 But, by 
elevating proof of an alternative design to a mandatory element, the new 
Restatement created a new “reasonable alternative design” test for most 
design defect cases that would undermine strict liability rationales. 
The policy rationale for the new design defect liability was 
suspect, but that was lost in a highly controversial claim that the design 
defect proposals of the new Restatement, including proof of an 
alternative design, constituted the majority rule in the United States.25 
“Majority rules” are powerful because they relieve the necessity for 
policy analysis by invoking stare decisis. But the products liability 
  
 22 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. A (1998). 
 23 Id. § 2(b). 
 24 Wade, supra note 14, at 837 (referring to the “manufacturers ability to eliminate the 
unsafe character of the product without impairing its usefulness”). Making alternative design proof 
mandatory, however, opens the door to foreclosing claims under the guise of Daubert “gate 
keeping.” The results in just the first six years following Daubert are striking. Challenges to expert 
testimony increased by 50%, summary judgments based on the exclusion of expert testimony 
increased by over 100%, and 90% of those summary judgments were against the plaintiffs. Of those 
cases, 24% were products liability claims. L. DIXON & B. GILL, RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, 
CHANGES IN THE STANDARDS FOR ADMITTING EXPERT EVIDENCE IN FEDERAL CIVIL CASES SINCE 
THE DAUBERT DECISION (RAND 2001). 
 25 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2(b) Reporters’ Note, cmt. b 
(1998).  
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decisions were a conglomeration of results that defied any majority 
rule,26 and there was no support for a contention that courts had rejected 
the basic rationales of modern products liability law in design defect 
claims. Many commentators saw these design defect proposals as 
nothing more than a thinly disguised “tort reform” agenda.27  
As far as a new focus on manufacturer expectations is 
concerned, allowing design “trade-offs” to trump product safety 
undermines the basic purpose of modern products liability law. Rather 
than making products presumptively safe, as they would be in an 
unqualified risk/benefit regime, the focus of products liability law should 
remain on encouraging the design, production, and marketing of safe 
products. And, shifting the cost of injuries to consumers to incentivize 
them to take precautions would saddle them with the burden of 
discovering product risks, which are or should be known to but are often 
not disclosed by product sellers. This approach is contrary to established 
precedent, which provides that consumers are not negligent in failing to 
discover product defects or guard against the possibility of their 
existence.28 
The deliberations over these proposals and their rationales were 
some of the most contentious in ALI history. Although the proposals 
were ultimately adopted by the ALI, many believed that the core 
provisions of section 2(b) were fundamentally flawed, a conclusion that 
was in significant part based on the rejection of the strict liability policy 
rationales for design defect claims.  
IV. POLICY RATIONALES 
Public policy rationales are the foundations upon which the legal 
rules rest. In the case of products liability, the original policy rationales 
that led to the adoption of strict liability were the ameliorative societal 
  
 26 The “counting” of Florida illustrates the flaws in the majority rule claim. In the 
Reporters’ Notes for Restatement (Third) it is claimed that Radiation Technology, Inc. v. Ware 
Const. Co., 445 So. 2d 329 (Fla. 1983), is “the leading case in Florida” and, in it, Florida adopted the 
risk/benefit test for design defect cases and implicitly required proof of an alternative design. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROBS. LIAB. § 2(b) Reporters’ Note, cmt. d (1998). There are, 
however, no such holdings in Radiation Technology, and it is far from being the leading Florida 
decision. 
 27 See, e.g., Douglas E. Schmidt et al., A Critical Analysis of the Proposed Restatement 
(Third) of Torts: Products Liability, 21 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 411, 412-13, 419-20 (1995) 
(collecting numerous articles stating that section 2(b) is “a vehicle for social reform” rather than a 
restatement of the existing law); Marshall S. Shapo, A New Legislation: Remarks on the Draft 
Restatement of Products Liability, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 215, 218 (1997) (Section 2(b) is not a 
description of existing law, but the invention of drafters who acted as “a sounding board for 
essentially political discussion.”); Frank J. Vandall, Constructing a Roof Before the Foundation is 
Prepared: The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability Section 2(b) Design Defect, 30 U. 
MICH. J.L. REFORM 261, 261-65 (1997) (Section 2(b) is “a wish list from manufacturing America” 
in which “[m]essy and awkward concepts such as precedent, policy, and case accuracy have been 
brushed aside for the purpose of tort reform.”). 
 28 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. n (1963); e.g., West v. Caterpillar 
Tractor Co., Inc., 336 So. 2d 80, 89 (Fla. 1976). 
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effects of risk spreading, litigation efficiencies resulting from simpler 
liability rules, deterrence of unsafe practices, and consumer expectations 
about the fitness and safety of products. But Restatement (Third) took a 
different tact for design defects. It found those rationales unsatisfactory 
and opted instead for a rationale based on “manufacture expectations” 
that a reasonably designed product will still carry some risk that cannot 
be designed out of the product at reasonable cost, and that product users 
should bear some of the risk of product design.29   
Dismissal of the strict liability rationales for design defects does 
not, however, survive analysis. Spreading the risk of product injuries 
through seller liability continues to best serve societal goals, a point 
Restatement (Third) acknowledges in the case of manufacturing defects 
but dismisses for design defects. But the applicability of this rationale 
does not vary with the cause of the product defect. If risk-spreading is a 
valid liability rationale, there is no principled reason why it does not also 
support strict liability for design defects. Indeed, risk spreading would 
probably be more efficient in a strict liability regime for design defects 
since, most likely, there would be greater liability for product injuries. 
Deterrence of unsafe practices, whether in a manufacturing or 
design context, is even more important now in an era of rapidly changing 
technology, deregulation, and underfunding of regulatory agencies than it 
was in the 1960s. The Restatement (Third) recognizes that fact for 
manufacturing defects by continuing strict liability rather than shifting to 
a fault-based regime under which sellers might escape liability. But, 
when it came to design defects, Restatement (Third) glossed over 
deterrence by arguing that too much deterrence would result in 
“excessively sacrificing product features,” and its different liability 
regime was “fair” because it would result in incentives to cause 
“consumers to engage in safe use and consumption of products.”30  Those 
arguments, however, simultaneously overstate and understate the case for 
dismissal of a deterrence rationale. They overstate the case because the 
former argument applies with equal force to manufacturing defects. 
Excessive quality control can affect product features just as excessive 
design. They understate the case because the latter argument would also 
apply to manufacturing defects and is, in any event, already addressed by 
product misuse and comparative negligence defenses. Indeed, legal 
“incentives” for consumer safety would probably add nothing since 
product users already have substantial personal incentives to avoid 
injury. 
The reality is that shifting to a negligence-based, risk/benefit 
regime for design defect claims would seriously undermine deterrence. 
Gone would be incentives to produce products that are safe for 
foreseeable uses, since sellers would only have to design to a standard 
  
 29 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. a (1998). 
 30 Id. 
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whereby benefits outweighed risks, and, when sued for a defective 
design, they could take refuge in the opinions of compliant experts and 
the inherent difficulties of proving an alternative design. If injury 
deterrence is a valid liability rationale, it applies with equal justification 
to both manufacturing and design defects.  
Litigation efficiencies would also be seriously undermined by a 
“reasonable alternative design” test regime. Strict liability was conceived 
to avoid the perils of negligence-based liability. Restatement (Third) 
would not only revive those risks but would make them more onerous 
since injured consumers would have to prove a previously unknown form 
of negligence: that the sellers’ conduct was negligent and that the seller 
could have adopted an alternative design.31 Litigation in such a regime 
would be more expensive, more extensive, and would result in far fewer 
consumer awards. 
The reasons for dismissal of the consumer expectations rationale 
for design defects are equally unavailing, a point foreshadowed by the 
contradictions and obvious unease in Restatement (Third)’s dismissal of 
consumer expectations. In the same comment, Restatement (Third) states 
that “consumer expectations do not play a determinative role in 
determining defectiveness” but a few lines later concedes that consumer 
expectations “may substantially influence or even be ultimately 
determinative on risk-utility balancing.”32 And, its criticism of consumer 
expectations as unworkable is undermined by the implicit invocation of 
consumer expectations as the foundation for comment e “manifestly 
unreasonable” designs and section 3 inferences of product defect. 
Moreover, the criticism of consumer expectations is further weakened by 
its express retention as the defect test for food and used products in 
sections 7 and 8. Indeed, when it is to their tactical advantage, defendants 
have no conceptual compunction about advocating a consumer 
expectations test.33 
Restatement (Third)’s principal criticism, that discerning 
consumer expectations about product design is too difficult, is 
unpersuasive when compared to the use of other legal tests, such as 
negligence concepts, which are routinely applied in myriad complex 
cases like those arising from professional malpractice. Nor are products 
too complex for consumers to understand. It is not necessary for a 
  
 31 Green v. Smith & Nephew AHP, Inc., 629 N.W.2d 727, 751-52 (Wis. 2001). 
(“[Section] 2(b) increases the burden for injured consumers not only by requiring proof of the 
manufacturer’s negligence, but also by adding an additional—and considerable—element of proof to 
the negligence standard.”). 
 32 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. g (1998).  
 33 Tobacco defendants have consistently argued for a “consumer expectations” test so 
they can defend on the historical record of tobacco dangers. E.g., Wright v. Brooke Group Ltd., 652 
N.W.2d 159 (Iowa 2002). And, it is not uncommon for defendants to claim that a risk/benefit test 
should not apply to design defect claims involving “simple” products to pave the way for an 
argument that the claim should fail because the danger was open and obvious. E.g., Mikolajczyk v. 
Ford Motor Co., No. 104983, 2008 WL 4603565 (Ill. Oct. 17, 2008). 
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consumer to appreciate all the details or intricacies of a product to have 
an expectation of safety.34 With modern marketing and advertising, there 
are virtually no products for which consumers cannot have an 
expectation of safety. If consumer expectations are sufficiently 
discernable that they can be “ultimately determinative” in one context, 
then there is no principled reason why they are not also sufficiently 
discernable to guide strict liability for design defects. Beyond this 
argument, there is a salutary benefit from a degree of unpredictability in 
the consumer expectations test that encourages sellers to err on the side 
of safer designs.35 
In the end, dismissal of this and the other policy rationales as 
support for a strict liability design defect regime just does not add up. 
Shifting to a “manufacturer expectations” rationale and a more easily 
defended risk/benefit regime would enviably lead to less liability. Lost 
would be the fundamental purpose of strict liability⎯to relieve injured 
consumers of having to prove negligence, the societal purposes of 
deterrence of unsafe practices, and of having the cost of injuries borne by 
the manufacturers rather than consumers, who are ordinarily powerless to 
protect themselves.  
V. JUDICIAL HISTORY 
The dismissal of modern products liability rationales for design 
defect cases was a harbinger for what followed in the courts. The case 
was not made that courts had rejected those rationales or were even open 
to their modification. Nor was any case made that design defect liability 
needed to be restricted.36 With no compelling rationales for section 2(b) 
and serious questions about its support from case law, it was not 
surprising that before the ink was dry, the design defect provisions of 
Restatement (Third) were in trouble and have now been largely rejected.  
While still only in draft form, the Georgia Supreme Court37 
refused to mandate proof of an alternative design and the Supreme 
  
 34 Green, 629 N.W.2d at 742-43 (“These standards are straightforward and may be 
applied even in “complex” cases. . . . As we have explained, juries are always called upon to make 
decisions based on complex facts in many kinds of litigation. . . . The problems presented in 
products liability jury trials would appear no more insurmountable that similar problems in other 
areas of the law. For these reasons, we reject the notion that the consumer-contemplation test cannot 
be applied in cases involving technical or mechanical matters.”) (citations and quotations omitted). 
 35 Implicit in the argument that consumer expectations are too difficult to discern is a 
distrust of the jury process—that even if appropriately instructed, juries are unable to handle such a 
task. A moment’s thought, however, exposes the biased elitism of such paternalistic thinking. Jurors 
are routinely entrusted with decisions involving myriad complex factual situations, huge financial 
implications, and life or death consequences, and they perform their duty with admirable dedication.  
 36 Products liability claims already represent only an infinitesimally small percentage of 
tort litigation. R. LAFOUNTAIN ET AL., EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS, 2007: A 
NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE FROM THE COURT STATISTICS PROJECT 6 (2008) (reporting that according 
to the most recent data, products liability cases amount to only 4% of new tort cases).  
 37 Banks v. ICI Americas, Inc., 450 S.E.2d 671 (Ga. 1994). 
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Courts of California and Connecticut38 rejected section 2(b). The decision 
of the Connecticut Court in Potter v. Chicago Pneumatic was stunning, 
coming just days after final passage of Restatement (Third). The Potter 
court boldly questioned the scholarship underlining section 2(b), 
concluding it was wrong. The court independently reviewed the law and 
found “that the majority of jurisdictions do not impose upon plaintiffs an 
absolute requirement to prove a feasible alternative design” and that such 
a requirement “imposes an undue burden on plaintiffs that might 
preclude otherwise valid claims from jury consideration.”39 Potter also 
rejected the core principle that the consumer expectation test should not 
apply in design defect cases but ultimately adopted a “modified” 
consumer expectation test under which the test to be applied would 
depend on whether a product is “complex.”40 
After Potter, the Supreme Courts of Missouri, Kansas, Oregon, 
Wisconsin, New Hampshire, and the Maryland Court of Appeals all 
refused to adopt section 2(b).41 Against this parade of decisions, only 
Iowa has expressly adopted section 2(b), and it did so in a tobacco claim 
in which the plaintiff urged its adoption to prevent the defendant from 
relying on consumer expectations.42 
One should note, however, the recent, bizarre, convoluted 
decision of the Illinois Supreme Court in Mikolajczyk v. Ford Motor 
Co.43 While expressly refusing to adopt section 2(b)44 or to require proof 
of an alternative design,45 the court reversed a plaintiff’s verdict for 
failure to give a jury instruction that relegated consumer expectations to 
an element in a risk/benefit test that appeared to require proof of an 
alternative design.46 While the Mikolajczyk court acknowledged that both 
the consumer expectations and risk/benefit tests were established Illinois 
  
 38 Carlin v. Superior Court, 920 P.2d 1347 (Cal. 1996); Potter v. Chicago Pneumatic 
Tool Co., 694 A.2d 1319 (Conn. 1997). 
 39 Potter, 694 A.2d at 1331-32. 
 40 Potter failed to provide guidance for how to determine when a product was 
“complex,” which only creates new uncertainties and litigation issues. As noted in Green, the so-
called “complex design” is a false paradigm that does nothing to further a well-ordered regime. 629 
N.W.2d 727, 742 (Wis. 2001).  
 41 Rodriguez v. Suzuki Motor Corp., 996 S.W.2d 47, 64-65 (Mo. 1999); Delaney v. 
Deere & Co., 999 P.2d 930 (Kan. 2000); McCathern v. Toyota Motor Corp., 23 P.3d 320 (Or. 
2001); Green v. Smith & Nephew AHP, Inc., 629 N.W.2d 727 (Wis. 2001); Vautour v. Body 
Masters Sports Indus., Inc., 784 A.2d 1178 (N.H. 2001); Halliday v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 792 A.2d 
1145 (Md. 2002). 
 42 Wright v. Brooke Group Ltd., 652 N.W.2d 159, 162, 169 (Iowa 2002). Texas and 
Tennessee courts have also affirmatively used section 2(b) but those courts were constrained to do so 
because they were interpreting tort reform legislation which already contained a risk/benefit test and, 
in the case of the Texas, a proof of alternative design requirement. Ray v. Bic Corp., 925 S.W.2d 
527, 533 (Tenn. 1996); Hernandez v. Tokai Corp., 2 S.W.3d 251, 256-57 (Tex. 1999). 
 43 No. 104983, 2008 WL 4603565 (Ill. Oct. 17, 2008). 
 44 Id. at *16. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. at *30. 
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law,47 it used misguided conclusions that the two tests are not theories of 
liability and that parties are entitled to have juries instructed on their 
theory of the case48 to hold that a section 2(b) type instruction must be 
given whenever the defendant elects to offer risk/benefit proof. In other 
words, under Mikolajczyk the defendant is allowed to dictate the type of 
claim that a plaintiff can submit to the jury. This muddled, unprincipled 
reasoning amounts to doctrinal collapse from which any conclusion 
could follow. 
The other decisions rejecting section 2(b) are remarkable 
because they bluntly state that the Restatement (Third) “goes beyond the 
law”49 and sets the bar too high.50 They recognize that Restatement 
(Third) would unduly restrict remedies, elevate defendant protectionism 
over consumer interests, and return to a pre-Restatement (Second) era 
where meritorious claims frequently went without redress.51 And 
appending a mandatory requirement of proof of an alternative design, as 
Restatement (Third) seeks to do, would only compound that effect.52 On 
a more basic level, these cases reflect a failure of acceptable rationale for 
the core provisions of section 2(b) and unwillingness on the part of 
courts to abandon the original products liability rationales.53 In addition, 
these cases make it clear that whatever one made of the pre-Restatement 
(Third) “weight of authority” and to whatever extent it is relevant to a 
well-ordered design defect liability regime, it is no longer debatable that 
the core provisions of section 2(b) are not the majority rule today. 
VI. GUIDING PRINCIPLES AND NORMATIVE RULES FOR DESIGN 
DEFECT CLAIMS 
In many jurisdictions, common law rules for products liability 
claims have been constrained by waves of “tort reform” enactments. 
  
 47 Id. at *22. 
 48 It is without question that strict liability and negligence are theories of liability, not 
different types of evidence. Moreover, the idea that a defendant can dictate the theory of liability 
under which the case is to be decided is without foundation in American jurisprudence. Hopefully, 
this embarrassing opinion will soon be corrected. 
 49 Delaney v. Deere & Co., 999 P.2d 930, 946 (Kan. 2000).  
 50 Potter v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 694 A.2d 1319, 1332 (Conn. 1997); Green v. 
Smith & Nephew AHP, Inc., 629 N.W.2d 727, 751 (Wis. 2001). 
 51 Even under Restatement (Second), products liability claims were extremely difficult 
with favorable state court outcomes in the country’s most populous counties of just 40.5% and in 
federal courts of just 26.8%. Deborah Jones Merritt & Kathryn Ann Barry, Is the Tort System in 
Crisis? New Empirical Evidence, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 315, 386-87 (1999). 
 52 While Restatement (Third) would not require production of a prototype to establish an 
alternative design, that provision does not ameliorate the burden of this new requirement. Nor does it 
lessen that burden to provide that expert testimony would not be necessary in “obvious” cases and 
that, in any event, a plaintiff “is not required to establish with particularity the costs and benefits 
associated with adoption of the suggested design,” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. 
§ 2 cmt. f (1998), since most cases are not “obvious” and dispensing with an economic analysis still 
leaves the base requirement of alternative design intact.  
 53 Carlin v. Superior Court, 920 P.2d 1347, 1349 (Cal. 1996); Potter, 694 A.2d at 1340; 
Green, 629 N.W.2d at 749, 752. 
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Where courts still play significant roles in the development of products 
liability law, normative rules for design defect claims have been elusive 
but that need not be the case. There are clear choices available, grounded 
in the different regimes of strict liability and negligence. Each choice is 
conceptually different and focuses on different aspects of product 
commerce. Strict liability addresses the product itself, how safe it is, and 
how it is used, while negligence concerns the marketing decisions that 
lead to the product being offered for sale or use. Each informs important 
aspects of products liability and both should be available to injured 
consumers who seek redress for harm from product injuries.54 In 
addition, each informs other aspects of products liability law in ways that 
can affect the choice between a strict liability or negligence regime.  
A. Strict Liability 
Strict liability should hold sellers liable for product designs that 
are unreasonably dangerous, regardless of whether the product seller 
exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of the product. This 
liability standard is consistent with the rationales for modern products 
liability law, especially consumer expectations of product safety and 
fitness that exist in the absence of disclosure or warnings of danger, 
which often do not occur or are carefully camouflaged for marketing 
considerations. Indeed, as Restatement (Third) acknowledges, safety and 
performance expectations can be readily created by the ways in which 
products are portrayed in modern advertising campaigns.55 In much the 
same fashion, safety and fitness expectations can also be created by the 
absence of  information about product dangers. Holding product sellers 
to such a standard is conceptually consistent with the obligation of sellers 
to test product designs since consumers can reasonably expect that 
product testing will be done, and its results will be accounted for in the 
product that is offered for sale and use. Indeed, it is a basic tenet of 
products liability law that consumers have the right to assume that 
products are safe and do not have to guard against product defects or the 
possibility of their existence.  
Strict products liability is also consistent with parallel, implied 
warranty liability for harm to the product itself. There is no principled 
reason why the results should be different simply because the harm was 
  
 54 Under 402A, injured consumers had the option of bringing either a strict liability or 
negligence claim, or both claims in a single action. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A 
cmt. a (1963) (“The rule stated here is not exclusive, and does not preclude liability based upon the 
alternative ground of negligence of the seller, where such negligence can be proved.”); see, e.g., 
Ford Motor Co. v. Hill, 404 So. 2d 1049, 1052 (Fla. 1981) (“If so choosing . . . a plaintiff may also 
proceed in negligence.”). While in most cases strict liability will be the theory of choice, in some 
instances as with, for example, products with sordid safety histories, cases with clear, compelling 
evidence, and products with publicly known risk histories, negligent marketing may be the best 
choice for an injured user.  
 55 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. f (1998). 
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to a person rather than the product. In either case, because the 
manufacturer stands to economically benefit from the distribution and 
sale of the product, it should be obligated to produce a reasonably safe 
product, and, in the case of malfunction, should provide redress for all 
harm, whether to the product or to a user.56  
Restatement (Third), however, decrees that product design (when 
it causes personal injury) can only be approached through the lens of a 
cost-benefit analysis.57 But that denigrates product safety to a subsidiary 
role in which product sellers could escape liability for unsafe products if 
consumers were unable to marshal proof of alternative designs or prove 
sufficiently overweighing risks. Such a rule puts consumers at risk of 
becoming guinea pigs for field-testing new products with no effective 
remedy when the tests go array.  
The Restatement (Third)’s “alternative design test” is not the 
only way that designs can be evaluated. As 402A recognized, the 
foundation of liability rules can be found in foreseeable product uses, 
including foreseeable misuses. For those uses, consumers should have a 
right to expect there will be a zone of safety within which users and by-
standers will be reasonably free from product harm. Thus, the proper 
degree of safety for a product should be set by its foreseeable use, and 
sellers, who produce products that cause injury when being used in a 
foreseeable way, should be liable for the resulting harm. 
In section 3, Restatement (Third) comes close to this standard for 
design defects. Nominally based on res ipsa loquitur, that section 
recognizes an inference of product defect when the “product fails to 
perform its manifestly intended function . . . .” a proposition that is, 
according to Restatement (Third), as “well-formed” as the consumer 
expectations that apply in food and used products.58 Although not 
specifically mentioned, section 3 is necessarily based on consumer 
expectations since manifestly intended product functions are grounded in 
what consumers expect about the features, functions, and safety of the 
product. However, in its single-minded but confusing effort to abolish 
consumer expectations for design defect claims, Restatement (Third) 
glosses over that fact.59 Ultimately, section 3 falls short because, as 
noted, the res ipsa inference is normally used only when the product is 
lost or destroyed, and the plaintiff is required to prove that the harm was 
not caused by other factors, including the conduct of others, proof that 
  
 56 As noted in Restatement Third, implied warranty and strict liability are substantively 
identical. Id. § 2 cmts. n, r.  
 57 Id. § 2 cmt. d. 
 58 Id. § 3 cmt. b. By its terms, section 3 is applicable to both manufacturing and design 
defects. As noted in Restatement Third, both res ipsa loquitur and strict liability perform similar 
functions by “allowing deserving plaintiffs to succeed notwithstanding what would otherwise be 
difficult or insuperable problems of proof.” Id. § 2 cmt. a. 
 59 As noted herein, while claiming that consumer expectations cannot be the “test” for 
product design, Restatement Third recognizes that consumer safety expectations can be the 
determinative factor in design evaluation. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.  
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would not be necessary under 402A. Nevertheless, section 3 signals the 
way in which design defect liability should be described. 
Foreseeable uses need to be distinguished from foreseeable risks. 
Negligence liability is contained by foreseeable risks so that actors are 
only required to take precautions against risks that are foreseeable. 
Product strict liability, which holds sellers liable even though exercising 
all possible care, is not limited to foreseeable risks and encompasses all 
risks arising from unreasonably dangerous products.60 Restatement 
(Third), however, rejects holding manufacturers liable for unforeseen 
risks because, it argues, any increased investment in safety that would be 
fostered is a matter of “guesswork.”61 But if it is “guesswork,” than it 
equally cannot be said that an increased scope of liability would not 
produce a higher level of safety vigilance. In any event, this argument 
ignores the historical record of the ameliorative impact of strict liability 
litigation on product safety. Using foreseeable risks to limit defect design 
liability will necessarily undermine that effect. The ultimate result would 
be defendant protectionism at the expense of product safety. 
As a basis for design evaluation, or for any other purpose, 
foreseeable product uses may be established in many ways. Some will be 
obvious from the nature of the product, others may be created by the way 
a seller portrays the product, still others may be discerned from industry 
experience, and others may be informed by the testing process. But 
regardless of the source, if a product design permits injury when the 
product is being used in a foreseeable way, liability for the resulting 
harm should follow. Thus, it does not necessarily follow that the only 
way a product design can be evaluated is by comparison with an 
alternative design or under a risk/benefit test.  Consumer expectations 
about safety for foreseeable uses, as informed by product portrayal, can 
form a rational, reasonable basis for liability determinations.  
Adopting this test for design defects would eliminate any need to 
specify whether a claim was based on a manufacturing or design defect 
since in either case the test would be the same.62 As noted in Restatement 
(Third), at times the cause of a defect is not clear63 and, in those 
instances, a plaintiff is at risk of making the wrong choice or of having to 
make alternative claims, which might appear to a jury as implausible or 
indecisive. That is the very type of result that Restatement (Second) 
sought to eliminate by the adoption of 402A liability.  
  
 60 Green v. Smith & Nephew AHP, Inc., 629 N.W.2d 727, 745-46 (Wis. 2001). The 
obligation of product sellers is to discover and design risks out of their products or, if unable to do 
so, provide appropriate warning of them. 
 61 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. a (1998).  
 62 E.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Hill, 404 So. 2d 1049 (Fla. 1981); McConnell v. Union 
Carbide Corp., 937 So. 2d 148 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006). 
 63 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 3 cmt. b (1998). 
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B. Negligence 
Negligence, on the other hand, should hold sellers liable for 
marketing a product when a reasonably prudent seller would decline to 
do so. Unlike strict liability, negligence does not depend on a finding of 
product defectiveness or inherent danger.64 It is sufficient that negligent 
conduct creates an unreasonable risk of harm to users of the product and 
foreseeable by-standers. From a conceptual standpoint, the analysis is 
one of reasonableness based on the risks of injury from the product 
versus the benefits afforded by the product, but the ultimate liability 
issue is one of prudent conduct. The inquiry is whether in marketing the 
product the seller created an unreasonable risk of injury due to the 
condition of the product.  
C. Related Issues in Alternate Liability Regimes  
Products liability cases do not always arise in factual scenarios 
that neatly fit either a strict liability or negligence claim. And, because of 
the way these different theories impact other aspects of products liability 
law, it is sometimes important to be able to bring a case based on one or 
the other theory, or even under alternative theories. Therefore, both 
liability theories should be available to injured product users and 
foreseeable by-standers as alternate liability theories, and courts should 
avoid hybrid regimes that conflate strict liability and negligence. One 
way to do so is to be cognizant of how these theories impact related 
product liability issues. 
1. Obligation to Test Product Designs 
Product sellers cannot feign ignorance of risks. As correctly 
noted in Restatement (Third), manufacturers have an obligation to test 
product designs, are charged with the knowledge such testing would 
impart, and, where feasible, must adopt safer designs over warning of 
risk.65  
In properly ordered regimes, whether a product was adequately 
tested or the manufacturer responded in a proper manner to the testing 
results should not be an issue in strict liability claims since liability exists 
for unreasonably dangerous designs regardless of the manufacturer’s 
care. Even if a manufacturer appropriately tested its product, it matters 
not in strict liability if the product still was unreasonably dangerous for 
foreseeable uses. On the other hand, a manufacturer’s marketing decision 
  
 64 Early decisions used the “inherently dangerous” nature of some products to justify 
liability. Under modern concepts that is no longer necessary and characterizing products as 
“inherently dangerous” adds nothing to the analysis. E.g., MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 
1050 (N.Y. 1916); Radiation Tech. Inc. v. Ware Const. Co., 445 So. 2d 329, 331 (Fla. 1983). 
 65 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmts. l, m (1998). 
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should be informed by the results of proper testing, whether it was done, 
and, what it revealed, which could be most relevant to a negligence 
claim. Thus, product testing issues have significantly different roles and 
conflating liability regimes can lead to confusion and serious conceptual 
problems in hybrid liability regimes.  
2. Product Warnings and Disclaimers 
Warnings should alert users to inherent risks or dangers of 
products. Disclaimers seek to avoid liability by “contractual” limitations. 
The latter are unavailing in modern products liability law.66  On the other 
hand, product warnings are a common feature of product marketing, 
reflecting the fact that in many instances it may not be commercially 
feasible to design a completely safe product and the common acceptance 
that when there is a residual risk of danger, the seller is obligated to warn 
of that risk. But how that obligation translates into products liability law 
has been a somewhat muddled picture.  
Restatement (Third) treats failure to warn or the inadequacy of 
warnings as a product defect.67 Under that approach, plaintiffs generally 
must prove that a warning was required and that either the seller failed to 
provide one or the warning that was provided was inadequate.68 But, in 
describing the rules that should apply in design defect contexts, 
Restatement (Third) presents contradictory positions. On the one hand, it 
states that warnings are not a substitute for safe design and, where “a 
safer design can reasonably be implemented, . . . adoption of the safer 
design is required over a warning that [would lead to] a significant 
residuum of such risks.”69 On the other hand, it recognizes warnings as a 
factor that can be considered in liability determinations.70  
In part, Restatement (Third) has it correct. Products liability 
law’s goal of elimination of product defects would be achieved in part by 
limiting the role of warnings so that they cannot be used as a substitute 
for safe design, an all too common impulse on the part of some 
manufacturers. Restatement (Third) has it wrong, however, when it 
unqualifiedly allows warnings to be taken into account in evaluating 
design liability. Under those circumstances, warnings would become 
substitutes for safe design since they could offset product risks or even 
dictate a reasonable design finding. Restatement (Second) was closer to 
the mark when it recognized that liability should only be constrained if a 
product was “useful and desirable” and the seller provided “proper 
  
 66 Id. § 18. 
 67 Id. § 2(b) cmt. i.  
 68 The rules for warning claims are set forth in Restatement (Third) section 2(c). They are 
not, however, the focus of this Article and are referenced herein only insofar as they relate to design 
defect claims. 
 69 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. l (1998). 
 70 Id. § 2 cmt. f. 
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directions and warning.”71 Neither Restatement, however, goes far 
enough because they do not explain how warnings should work in a well-
ordered design defect regime. 
Since it is the obligation of manufacturers in the first instance to 
produce safe products, warnings should only relieve liability for product 
design when the manufacturer demonstrates that product dangers could 
not have been reasonably designed out of the product and that the 
product was “useful and desirable.” This two-pronged test requires 
examination of the rigor and validity of the design process and a 
demonstration that the product served a useful purpose. The burden 
should be on the manufacturer to justify the use of warnings by making 
this showing since it controls the design process, has better information 
than injured consumers, and presumably has better technical knowledge.  
This obligation becomes more muddled when it comes to so-
called open and obvious risks.72 Restatement (Third) accepts the 
traditional view that warning of obvious risks is unnecessary because the 
existence of such risks constitutes “notice” of their presence and a further 
warning would serve no useful purpose.73 This rule, however, has it 
backwards. It is focused on individual users (and when they might 
successfully bring a failure to warn claim), rather than when a warning 
must be given to fulfill the obligation that is owed to the entire user 
population. In terms of providing warnings, it matters not whether a 
particular member of the user population required a warning; the warning 
must be provided if any segment of the user population needs it.  
The rule is also wrong to the extent that it implies that 
“obviousness” can be determined simply from the nature of the product. 
That concept is wrongheaded because “obviousness” of risk is not a 
static quality but one that will vary with the capabilities of the user 
population. What might be obvious to a narrow, experienced user 
population might become less obvious or unobvious when the population 
expands to include less capable members. Since the seller’s obligation to 
warn runs to all foreseeable users, the obligation to warn must be 
measured by the least capable in that population. In addition, some 
product users may not have real alternatives to using dangerous products, 
and in those circumstances, a warning may make the difference. It may 
also be foreseeable that users will ignore, be inattentive of, or be 
distracted from a risk,74 in which case warnings should be required. 
“Obviousness” is therefore a nuanced concept and not all cases of patent 
danger should automatically foreclose an obligation to warn of danger. In 
the final analysis, rather than a blanket rule that looks only to the nature 
of the defect, if after all reasonable efforts to provide a safe design a 
  
 71 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, cmt. k (1963).  
 72 See Part VI.E for discussion of the “open and obvious” defense. 
 73 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2(b) cmt. j (1998). 
 74 Delaney v. Deere & Co., 999 P.2d 930, 939, 942 (Kan. 2000). 
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product still contains inherent risk, the product seller should be required 
to warn against those risks if there is a reasonable chance that a warning 
can contribute to risk avoidance for any foreseeable user group, for any 
foreseeable use. The inquiry would then focus on the real point of strict 
liability—that is, whether, had a warning been given or been given in a 
more adequate manner, it would have contributed to avoiding or 
lessening the plaintiff’s injuries. 
Once a defendant establishes prima facie that warnings were 
warranted and given, the consumer could then contest the adequacy and 
reasonableness of the warnings. Contesting the warnings would not, 
however, be appropriate if it was demonstrated that the product user 
would have used the product even if warned in a proper and appropriate 
manner. 
In properly ordered regimes, warnings should thus play 
significantly different roles in strict liability and negligence claims. For 
strict liability, warnings should be an affirmative defense with the burden 
on the manufacturer to establish that warnings were an appropriate way 
to address product safety and that the warning it provided accomplished 
that purpose. For negligent actions, the burden would be on the plaintiff 
to establish that the product seller failed to provide a warning sufficient 
to reduce or avoid foreseeable risks of harm from the product.75 This is 
another instance of where serious conceptual problems exist about how 
these concepts apply in hybrid liability regimes. 
3. Open and Obvious Defects 
Restatement (Third) has it right on the so-called “open and 
obvious” defect defense.76 As explained, the fact that a design-related 
risk is open and obvious bears on the issue of defectiveness and 
negligence but does not necessarily preclude liability.77 It is, after all, 
product sellers who are best placed to know and understand how a 
product can be made safe, and no blanket rule should absolve them of 
that obligation. To hold otherwise could encourage marketing of 
products with open and obvious defects, rather than utilizing a rigorous 
design protocol to develop a safe product. It would therefore be 
counterproductive and imprudent to preclude liability merely because the 
risk was open and obvious. Pursuant to modern concepts of risk 
allocation, the obviousness of a product risk should only be a factor to be 
considered in assessing responsibility. 
  
 75 In either case, comparative negligence is also a defense to products liability claims if 
based on grounds other than the failure of the user to discover the defect or guard against the 
possibility of its existence. E.g., West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80, 89-90 (Fla. 1976). 
 76 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. g (1998).  
 77 Id. § 2 cmt. d. 
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4. Alternative Designs; Industry Practice; State of the Art 
Evidence of alternative product designs should be relevant to 
both strict liability and negligence claims. For the former it can inform 
the issue of whether inherent risks could have been designed out of the 
product; for the latter it can inform the issue of whether it was prudent to 
market the product as designed. In neither case, however, should such 
evidence be required since there are many other ways to establish the 
unreasonable danger of a design or carelessness in marketing a product. 
Alternative designs may represent industry practice, which is 
sometimes confused with “state of the art.” It is generally accepted that 
industry practice is simply the range of practices found within an 
industry on any given subject and may represent a measure of what a 
prudent seller would or would not do. As such, it has no bearing on strict 
liability since such liability is independent of the care exercised and 
allowing industry practice to denominate product design would be 
tantamount to allowing an industry to set its own liability parameters. On 
the other hand, compliance with or failure to follow industry practices 
can bear on the reasonableness of marketing a product under a 
negligence claim. This is another instance where serious questions of 
application can arise in a hybrid liability regime. 
“State of the art” differs from industry practice (although it could 
be, but rarely is, coextensive with industry practice). State of the art 
generally is the most advanced state of technology at any given point in 
time. Sellers generally contend that they cannot be held to product 
designs that do not reflect the “state of the art” at the time the product 
was designed and manufactured. While it is a truism that sellers cannot 
be required to use technology that did not exist, the fact that a particular 
design had not yet been adopted by any manufacturer should be 
immaterial as long as it was technologically feasible at the time the 
product was designed and built. On the other hand, sellers should be held 
to the expert standard of knowledge that was available to the relevant 
industry at the time the product was designed and produced, and failure 
to apply that knowledge can be relevant in negligent design cases. 
5. Inferences of Defect and Negligence 
It is commonly accepted that when products fail in normal usage, 
an inference arises that the failure was due to product defect or seller 
negligence.78 The rule does not require identification of a specific defect 
or determination of whether it was a manufacturing or design defect.79 
Often the inference arises when the product has been lost or destroyed, 
but the rule is not restricted to those circumstances. The rule is also often 
  
 78 Id. § 3. 
 79 E.g., Cassisi v. Maytag Co., 396 So. 2d 1140, 1153 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981). 
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explained as a substitute for (missing) proof of a specific defect but, to 
give full effect, it should not be so limited and should apply even where 
there is proof of a specific defect. Otherwise, a deserving plaintiff could 
be prejudiced by trying to develop proof of a specific defect, which a 
defendant could then use to negate an inference of liability. 
This rule should not, however, be a simple inference to merely 
establish a prima facie case. Were that its sole function, it would 
“disappear” once dispositive motions were denied and plaintiffs would 
be left with no evidence for the jury to consider. To achieve its intended 
purpose, this inference must remain in the case for jury consideration, a 
point alluded to but not specifically delineated in Restatement (Third).80 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Restatement (Third) missed the mark for normative rules in a 
well-ordered design defect regime. Intended or not, it has been seen as 
rolling back decades of progress and returning to an era of defendant 
protectionism. To establish normative rules, renewed efforts that build 
upon the modern rationales of strict liability are necessary. When 
approached in this manner, it is possible to define a just set of rules that 
encourage the design and sale of reasonably safe products and, at the 
same time, properly limit liability.  
  
 80 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 3 cmt. b (1998) (“Section 3 allows 
the trier of fact to draw the inference . . . .”); e.g., Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 
439-40 (Cal. 1944); see also FED. R. EVID. 301. 
